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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINCOLN C. WHITE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WESTERN EMPIRE LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, and 
A. A. TIMPSON, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Case No. 9156 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The District Court entered judgment for the 
Respondent, Lincoln C. White, against the Appel-
lant, Western Empire Life Insurance Company, for 
damages suffered by the Respondent for failure of 
the Appellant to comply with its agreement to sell 
Western Empire Life Insurance Company capital 
stock. Lincoln C. White had bought 60 shares of the 
capi'tal stock from the Appellants between Decem-
ber 31, 1957 and January 4, 1958 at a price of 
$60.00 per share or $3600.00. The Appellant was 
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engaged in an intensive selling campaign of its 
capital stock, under the direction of its President, 
A. A. Timpson. The extent of the president's activity 
and management of the stock selling campaign ap-
pears from 'the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board 
of Directors of Western Empire Life Insurance 
Company. (Ex. 9) At a more appropriate place in 
this brief we will quote excerpts of the minutes in 
support of this statement. We refer particularly 
to the January 4, 1958 meeting (Page 45 of Ex. 9) 
'to show that it was of utmost importance 'to the 
Appellant that it sell i'ts capital stock. The company 
was making a special effort to sell its capital stock 
and get in the purchase price forthwith. In order 
to sell some stock and get in the money, the presi-
dent of the Appellant entered into an agreement 
with the Respondent to resell at $120.00 per share, 
any stock which the Respondent purchased at $60.00 
per share, such resale to be made after April1, 1958. 
(Ex. 3) Exhibit 3 is on the officia'l S1tationery of the 
Western Empire Life Insurance Company which 
lists A. A. Timpson as 1the President of the company 
and the letter is signed by A. A. Timpson as the 
President of the company. 
The Respondent paid the purchase price of 60 
shares and later requested Appellant to sell the 60 
shares of capital stock for $7200.00, less the com-
mission. A ppellan't did not sell the stock and the 
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judgment against the Appellant results from the 
failure and breach of agreement. 
Appel1ant contends that the agreement was not 
within the authori'ty of the president of the company 
or at least that part of the agreement requiring the 
company to resell the stock was not within the au1th-
ori'ty of the president of the company. It is admitted 
that the president had au'thority 'to sell the stock 
and receive the money for the benefit of the com-
pany but the Appellant disavows that part of the 
contract by which the Appellant bound itself to sell 
the stock of the Respondent after four months, at 
an advance in price. Thus, the Appellant has taken 
the benefit of the contract, re'tained the purchase 
price received, has never offered to re1turn the pur-
chase price but wishes to disassociate itself from 
that part of the contract which required the Appel-
lant to seU the capital stock. 
APPELLANT C 0 M P LA I N S OF THREE 
FINDINGS MADE BY THE COURT. THESE 
FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD NOT BE DIS-
TURBED BY THIS COURT. 
The District Court found as a fact that the 
contract made by the corporation through i'ts presi-
dent agreeing to sell capital stock to the Respondent 
and also agreeing after the expiration of four 
months that it would resell that capital s1tock so 
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sold to the Respondent to a third person at an ad-
vance in price was a contract within the authority 
of the president of the corporation. The District 
Court found that the president of the corporation 
was authorized by the Board of Directors to sell 
capital stock of 'the Appellant corporation and inci-
dental to making such sales, to agree to making 
resale of that stock at an advance in price to a third 
person. ( R. 115) That finding of fact numbered 
6~ reads as fo'llows: 
Tha't the defendant A. A. Timpson, presi-
dent of the defendant corporation was auth-
orized by the Board of Directors of the said 
corporation to sell capital stock of the defen-
dant corporation and that the agreement made 
by the defendant corporation with the plain-
tiff was within the scope of the apparent and 
implied authority of the defendant, A. A. 
Timpson, as president of the defendant cor-
poration; that the first sentence of Section 1, 
Article XI of the By-Laws of Western Em-
pire Life Insurance Company reads as fol-
lows: 
'The President shall exercise the general 
supervision and direction of the affairs of the 
company." 
That the said A. A. Timpson was not 
expressly authorized by the Board of Direc-
tors of the defendant corporation to write, 
sign and deliver such a letter to the plaintiff. 
Appellant argues that the court erred in find-
ing that 'the president of the corporation had author-
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ity to bind the defendant corporation. It seems to 
counsel for the Respondent that this specification 
of error is stated far more broadly than the Appel-
lant intended. There could be no question that the 
corporation authorized i'ts president to sell its capital 
stock. We are certain that defendant in tended only 
to assert that the part of the agreement which obli-
gated 'the Appellant to sell stock at an advance in 
price at a later date was beyond the scope of the 
authority granted to the president. It is admitted 
that 'the president of the company was an author-
ized salesman of the Western Empire Life Insur-
ance Company to sell its stock. (R. 14) We refer 
to R. 96 where the following evidence appears: 
Q. (By Mr. N.J. Cotro-Manes, Attorney 
for the Western Life Insurance Company) 
Were you a salesman for the company were 
you an authorized sa1esman? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Talk loud. 
A. I was acting as salesman for lhe 
company. 
Q. Were you duly licensed by the in-
surance company to sell this stock? 
A. Yes. 
With this admission that the Appellant author-
ized its president to sell its capital stock, the Appel-
lant raises this narrow point: 
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The president of the corporation who was duly 
au'thorized to sell stock of the company, having en-
tered into a contract for the sale of s'tock 'to the 
Respondent and having agreed as part of the con-
tract of sa'le to resell the stock at an advance in price 
after the expiration of four months, is this latter 
provision of the single contract within the scope 
of the authority of the president of the W es1tern 
Empire Life Insurance Company? 
In addition to the express admission by the 
Appellant and its counsel above quoted (R. 96) 
that the president was authorized ~o sell stock, the 
minute book of the corporation (Ex. 9) contains 
repeated references to this authority having been 
granted to the presiden1t, in fac't, the president was 
the guiding spirit in the sale of the company stock. 
Excerpts from the minute book of the corporation 
follow: 
EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF MEET-
TINGS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: 
(9th Paragraph on Page 41 of Minute Book. 
(Ex. 9) Meeting of October 21, 1957) 
"The new stock issue should be ready 
within the month. Mr. Timpson made mention 
that the stock available, $300,000. would be 
more than needed at this time and suggested 
5,000 shares be kept in the treasury and 
brought out next year at $120. $10.00 per 
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share to go to capital and $110.00 into sur-
plus. Mr. Burton made a motion that Mr. 
Timpson go into it \vi th the attorney and 
actuary and bring their recommendations to 
the next Board meeting. Mr. Hollingsworth 
seconded the motion. Passed unanimously." 
Paragraph 1 on Page 43 of Minu1te Book. Meet-
ing of November 11, 1957) 
"Mr. Harmon inquired as to whether or 
not the Commissioner would be willing at this 
time 'to approve the transaction. Mr. Timpson 
replied he had ndt contacted the Commissioner 
at present, but would wait until the financial 
statement was ready before taking it up with 
him." 
Paragraph 5 on Page 43 of Minute Book. Meet-
ing of November 11, 1957) 
''Mr. Timpson stressed the importance of 
the first of the year statement as being most 
important to the Company, and that it was 
imperative that the $30.00 a share stock be 
paid for by the end of the year. It is for the 
best good of the Company that the $60.00 
stock be sold and paid for also. This state-
ment will determine whether or not the Com-
pany will qualify in other states." 
(Paragraph 6 on Page 44 of Minute Book. Meet-
ing December 6, 1957) 
"Mr. Taylor Burton asked how long it 
wou'ld take to get the financial statement out 
after the end of the year. Mr. Timpson re-
ported that i't takes several weeks to close 
the books and that we expect to get the $30.00 
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stock issue closed out and most of the $60.00 
issue collected for the financial report. There 
is $40,000. outs'tanding on the $30.00 issue 
and another $180,000.00 to be sold of the 
$60.00 issue of stock." 
(Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 - Page 45 of Minute 
Book- Meeting January 3, 195'8) 
Discussion of the stock issues before the 
close of the year's business ensued. Mr. Timp-
son reported Monday January 6, 1958 would 
be the last day of the money on the '$30.00 
stock to be turned in and tha't it was desire-
able to get as much of the $60.00 issue in by 
the end of the week as it would help the finan-
cial statement. Mr. Hollingworth stated it 
was a bad 1time of the year for everyone and 
that if they could take a 1i ttle longer to get 
the money in it might help the sale of the stock. 
Mr. Timpson asked the Boards opinion 
as to whether or not they should cut the 
$60.00 issue now and go into the new stock 
issue program. We will be able to go into 
Idaho with $50,000.00 of surplus. The low 
surplus which we have now is due to the low 
cost of the first issue of stock, and most of 
the surplus has been spent in Home Office 
Expenses, and the office equipment and fix-
tures cannot be shown as admitted assets 
on the financial statement. It will, therefore, 
be to the company's advan'tage to promptly 
close out with a new issue as soon as possible. 
D. R. Norton raised the question of turn-
ing the sale of the stock over to a broker. Mr. 
Harvey Glade of Provo, Manager of Hogle 
Investment Company in Provo contacted Mr. 
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Norton in regards to the sale of this com-
pany's stock and thought he would like to 
handle the sale of stock for us. After much 
discussion, it was recommended that Mr. Nor-
ton look into the possibility of having Mr. 
Glade handle the sale of stock. 
A motion was made by Keith Knight in 
accordance with the board's recommendation 
that the $60.00 issue of stock now be with-
drawn from the markets as of Monday at 5:00 
p.m., January 6, 1958, and that Mr. Timpson 
seek the commissioner's approval to sell an-
other issue of stock at $120.00. 
The motion was seconded by D. R. Nor-
ton and carried unanimously. 
The president of the company being authorized 
to seU the stock, it was within the scope of his auth-
ority to do whatever promoted and accomplished 
sales of stock. The president contacted this Respon-
dent to sell stock to him ; the Respondent refused to 
purchase. ( R. 30) The president of the Appellan't 
corporation then suggested that if the Respondent 
would purchase stock, the corporation would sell 
the stock for him at a later date at an advance price. 
The Respondent would not accept an oral agreement 
to that effect and instead insisted that that part of 
the agreement must be in writing, signed by the 
corporation. ( R. 31 ) . 
Two separate letters were execulted purporting 
to make an agreement that the stock would be sold 
at an advance in price, but the A ppeltan t refused to 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accept these two proferred letters, but finally ac-
cepted a letter executed by the corporation. (Ex. 3) 
Respondent then paid the price upon receiving this 
written agreement. The sale could not have been 
made wi1thout the delivery of the agreement to resell 
the stock at an advance in price. (R. 31) This inci-
dental agreement to resell the stock was basic to 'the 
agreement of the Respondent 'to buy the stock. This 
incidental agreement was connected with the auth-
ority that had been granted to the president to sell 
caprtal stock of the company. The agreement to re-
sell the stock was an integral par't of the agreement, 
pursuant to which the respondent purchased the 
stock. In the words of 'the late J us'tice Wolfe, his 
concurring op'inion in Skirl v. Willowcreek Coal Com-
pany, 92 Utah 474 69 P. 2d 502 at 5072 "The work 
which the agen't is really authorized to do must be 
such that the act which he does and in regard to which 
his authority is in question is usual or incidental or 
of the same nature or reasonably connected u~1· th that 
work or .authority which he actually has. . . ." 
(Emphasis added) "The apparent authority of an 
agent must be gathered from the facts and circum-
stances of the transaction as shown by the evidence. 
21 R.C.L. 854" U. S. Bond and Finance Corporation 
v. National Building and Loan Assoc1~ation, 80 Utah 
62, 12 P. 2d 758 a't 7602. 
In the instant case the facts and circumstances 
10 
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bring it within that line of cases dealing with the 
sales of securities with accompanying agreements 
to resell or repurchase, in which cases the courts 
jealously regard the rights of the buying public. 
This subject is fully annotated at 34 A.L.R. (2d) 
519 et. seq. The annotator there makes a distinction 
between 'the sale of tangible i terns of personal pro-
perty accompanied by a provision in the contract 
that the seller would subsequently resell the item 
of personal property and the sales of in tangible 
property such as securities also accompanied by 
such agreement 'to resell. The subject of that anno-
tation which is also the subject of this Brief is 
stated as follows: 
"Is an agen1t's agreement made contem-
poraneously with a sale of personal property, 
that the property sdld may be re1turned by the 
purchaser, or that the principal will repur-
chase the property from, or resell the property 
for, the purchaser, binding upon the principal, 
notwithstanding that the agent lacks express 
authority to so agree?" 
At the very beginning of the annotation, the 
annotator makes this su1nmary: 
''The cases discused herein fall naturally 
in1to two primary groupings - those involv-
ing sales of stocks, bonds, and dther securities, 
and those involving sales of other personal 
property. Although the rules of agency applic-
able to sales of either type are identical, it is 
interesting to note that the results reached 
by the courts in litigation concerning sales of 
11 
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securities differ significantly from the results 
reached when the matter at issue relates to 
sales of other personal property. 
Thus, in connection with the securities 
sales transactions, courts in a majority of 
jurisdictions have taken the view that an 
agent's agreement that the purchaser may 
return 'the securities, or that the principal 
will repurchase them from him, or rese1l them 
for him, is binding upon the principal as with-
in the agent's actual authority (that is, within 
the authority necessarily implied from the 
authority expressly conferred upon, though 
not itself a subject of express authorization) 
or within his apparent authority (that is, the 
authorirty which an innocent purchaser might 
reasonably expect him to have). 
And even in instances in which there have 
been findings that the agent's agreement for 
the return, repurchase, or resale of securities 
was unauthorized, the courts, through appli-
cation of the theory of ratification, have fre-
quently granted the purchaser the relief to 
which he would have been entitled had the 
agreemnt been held to bind the princi pa1 : in 
these cases it has been held that the principal, 
by retaining 'the benefits of his agent's con-
tract, is barred from denying the agent's 
authority to make the return, repurchase, or 
resale agreement which served as an induce-
ment for that contract." 
There follows in this annotation the cases which 
hold that if an agent is authorized 'to sell stock, that 
he has either implied authority or apparent author-
ity to make the agreement to resell the stock. The 
12 
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cases dealing with the sales of securities and which 
support this rule appear on Pages 515 through Page 
519. Beginning on 519 fol'lowing cases which the 
annotator states "appear to be a minority of juris-
dictions" are found the cases which counsel for the 
Appellant has stated in his Brief at Page 16. Coun-
sel has particularly referred to Morse v. Illinois 
Power and Light Company and M~trray v. Standard 
Pecan Company, two Illinois decisions which are 
from the minority jurisdictions and it is evident 
from the statements by the annotator, at pages 520 
and 521 'that the only reason these cases held 'that 
i't was not within the scope of authority of the agent 
to make an agreement 'to resell the securities was, 
that in each of these two cases the agent was not a 
general agent but mere'ly a special agent. In those 
two cases, the sales were made by a salesman who 
was not an Officer of the company. The annotator 
at Page 520 states, "The stock salesman was, in the 
court's view a special agent with limited author-
ity ... ''. 
It is clear therefore, that the president of the 
company who is authorized to sell capital stock of 
a corporation has implied authority to make a con-
tract to either repurchase the stock or to sell it for 
the purchaser. The following appears at 2 Am. Jur. 
page 101, note 14. 
"In Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. Greene & W. 
Teleph. Co. 127 Iowa, 350, 101 N. W. 742, 69 LRA 
13 
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968, 109 Am St. Rep. 387, the plaintiff recovered 
in an action for the par value of certain shares of 
stock in the defendant company pursuant to a con-
tract made in the name of the defendant corpora-
tion under its corporate sea'l, executed by the presi-
dent and secretary, whereby the defendant agreed 
that in a certain contingency it would repurchase 
the plaintiff's stock and pay the par value therefor. 
As to the defense that the officers had not authority 
in fact to make the contract, the court said, inter 
alia: 'It clearly appears from the implied color 
which the answers must give in order tha:t the de-
fense may be considered at all, that these officers 
did in fact make the contracts as alleged in the peti-
tion, under the seal of the corporation, and that the 
defendant corporation has had and enjoyed the bene-
fits of such con tracts. This being true, the corpora-
tion cannot accept and rtify the contracts in so far 
as they were beneficial to it, and repudiate them 
in so far as they imposed any liability on its part. 
It accepted plaintiff's money on the strength of these 
contracts, and cannot, while retaining the same, be 
heard to say that its officers had no authority to 
make the contracts under which it was received. 
This is hornbook 1law.'" 
There can be no question that Utah has this 
same rule. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P. 2d 
281, holds that a corporation was bound by a separ-
14 
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a:te collateral agreement to take 'the property sold, 
back, if it proved to be unsatisfactory, although a 
separate signed contract contained a provision that 
"The seller shall not be bound by any agreements 
or represen'tations not contained in this agreement". 
This collateral agreement was never brought to the 
attention of the corporation. In the instan't case the 
corporation did not deny that it was aware of 'the 
existence of this written agreement, Ex. 3. The an-
notation referred to cites this Utah case. Since 
our court has held tha't the co'llateral agreement in 
tha't case was within the implied and apparent scope 
of the authority of the traveling salesman, here 
the collateral agreement made by the president of 
the company and being 'the only written agreement, 
it is within 'the scope of the authority of the presi-
dent of the corporation. Upon the authorrty of the 
case just cited, we respectfully submit that this 
court should affirm the decision of the District 
Court. 
We now dire~t attention to some of the author-
ities c1ted by Appellants. 
The quotation from 2 Am. J ur. 77 on Page 16 
of Appellant's Brief reflects the minority view as 
is seen by reading further in the Am. Jur. Article 
on "Agency" Section 123, Page 101 and the 1959 
Pocket Part Supplement to Section 12'3 (Page 14 
of 1959 Supp'lemen't) We, therefore quote Section 
123 with the supplement added portion: 
15 
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Section 123. - Authority to Agree for 
Repurchase. - It is generally held that an 
agent who is authorized merely 'to sell person-
alty and to coHect and turn over the money for 
the same has not the power to bind the prin-
cipal by an agreement to repurchase the pro-
perty, which promise is made by the agent as 
an inducement to the consummation of the 
sale. However, in most cases arising upon 
such an agreement to repurchase made by the 
agent, the courts, in order to conform with 
the justice of the situa'tion, have granted re-
lief to the purchaser on the theory that the 
principal, by accepting the purchase money or 
the proceeds of the sale, ratifies the agree-
ment of the agent. 
The courts in other jurisdictions have 
taken the view that an agent's agreement 
that the principal wil'l repurchase the property 
or resell i't for the buyer is binding upon the 
principal as within the agent's actual author-
ity (that is, within the authority necessarily 
implied from the authority expressly confer-
red upon him, though not itself a subject of 
express authorization) , or within his apparent 
authority (that is, the authority which an in-
nocent purchaser migh't reasonably expect him 
to have). 
The Lockwi'tz case cited by Appellant states 
the general rule that a corporation acts through its 
Board of Directors but here the by-laws gave special 
powers to the president and the board itself author-
ized 'the president to sen the capital stock. That 
case is not au'thori1ty here because here we have only 
1the narrow question whether the president acted 
16 
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within the apparent or implied scope of the authority 
that was gran'ted 'to him by the board of directors 
and the by-laws of the corporation. 
Aggeller v. Musser Seed Company, cited by Ap-
pellant on Page 15 of its Brief (a three to two de-
cision) is based upon the facts in tha:t case. The ma-
jority opinion indicates that if the supervision and 
direction of the affairs of the company had been 
delegated to the president (as in this case) , the de-
cision of the majority would have been different. 
"\Ve have already quoted the finding of fact #6 
of 1this cour1t (R. 115), that the by-laws state: "That 
the president shall exercise the general supervision 
and direction of the affairs of the company". The 
majority opinion does not question the following 
authority quoted by the losing party in 1that case 
but simply states: "We are doubtfu1l whether the 
facts disclosed by the evidence are sufficient to bring 
'the case within the rule announced in the exerpts 
last above quoted". The exerpts quoted are at the 
top of Page 938 and art taken from Section 2033 
and 2034, Fletcher Cyc. Corps. Volume 3 and they 
read as follows: 
"The management of the en tire business 
of a corporation may be entrusted to its presi-
dent ei'ther by express resolution of the direc-
tors or by their acquiescence in a course of 
dealings. * * * If the president is expressly 
named or a ppoj n ted as general manager, or 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if he be put in active charge of all or a part 
of the corporate business, or if he is held out 
or permitted to act in behalf of 'the corpora-
tion in all matters or in regard to matters in 
a particular place, then his authority is meas-
ured by the rules relating 'to 'the authority of 
general or branch managers and not by the 
rules relating to the authority of a president 
by virtue of his office. * * * If the directors 
turn over the full and absolute management 
of all corporate affairs to the president and 
in no way interfers with his acts, he has 
power to do any act which the directors could 
authorize or ratify". 
The District Court, considering 'the facts and 
circumstances in the instant case, made the finding 
that the agreement of the Appellant corporation 
with the Respondent was within the scope of the 
apparent and implied authority of the president of 
the Western Empire Life Insurance Company. It is 
the responsibility of the trier of the facts to make 
the determination as to the scope and extent of the 
agent's authority. See subject "Agency" Vol. 2 Am. 
J ur., Section 454. It is there stated: "It is the settled 
general rule that this question of the scope apd 
extent of the agent's authority is to be decided from 
all 'the facts and circumstances in evidence and is 
to be determined by the triers of the facts. The 
apparent authority of an agent to act as the repre-
senta:tive of his principal is also to be gathered from 
all the facts and circumstances in evidence and 
18 
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ordinarily this is a question of fact for 'the jury's 
determination". Authority cited for this statement 
is U. S. Bond and Finance Corporation v. National 
B1rilding and Loan Association, 80 Utah 62, 12 P. 
2d 758, 17 P. 2d 238. The 1959 cumula:tive supple-
ment to this section cites for the same proposition, 
the Utah case of Park v. Moorman Manufacturing 
Company, 241 P. 2d 914, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273. At Page 
9192 of Park v. Moorman, the following statement 
appears: ''The question, like other questions of im-
plied or incidental authority is usual'ly a question of 
fact." 
The Judge of the District Court acting as the 
trier of the fact, has found that this agreement and 
the whole of it was within the a u'thori ty of the presi-
dent of the corporation. There is am pie evidence in 
support of 'this finding and that finding should no't 
be disturbed by this court. Child v. Child, 8 Utah 
(2) 261, 332 P. 2d 981, Christensen v. Christensen, 
9 Utah (2) 102, 339 P. 2d 101. In making this find-
ing of fact, the court must have considered tha't the 
president of the insurance company, having the au-
thority to sell the capital stock, had 'the authority 'to 
perform collateral acts and make collateral agree-
ments which are related to the responsibility of sell-
ing the capital stock. Park v. Moorman, 121 Utah 
339, 241 P. 2d 914. We quote from Page 919: 
"It is also evident that in order to get 
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this busines, McCullough had the authority 
common to all general managers to perform 
collateral acts which were incidental to this 
responsibility. As stated in Mechem on 
Agency, Se~tion 1781: 'Wherever the doing 
of a certain act or the transaction of a given 
affair or 'the performance of certain business 
is confided to an agent, the authority to so 
act will, in accordance wi1th a general rule 
often referred to, carry with it by impHcation 
the authority to do all of the collateral acts 
which are the natural and ordinary incidents 
of the main act or business authorized. The 
speaking of words, - the making of state-
ments, representations, declarations, admis-
sion, and 1the like - may as easily be such an 
incident as the doing of any other sort of act.' 
Further, 'Since the authority for the do-
ing of these incidental acts, however' springs 
from the authority to do the main act it must 
ordinarily end with it. The incidental thing 
mus1t be a part of the main thing. It must oc-
cur before the main act is completely ended: 
i't must take place while that is still going on.' 
In this case, McCullough's main author-
ity was to sell the product and to train sales-
men 'to sell it. In order to do this, certain 
statements were required to be made. Such 
statements sprang from the main authoriza-
tion and, in 'this case, were a part of the main 
act; occurring before the main act of selling 
plaintiff was ended and in fact made while 
carrying OU1t the main job of selling to the 
pla'in tiff." 
DISCUSSION OF POINTS 2 AND 4 IN BOTH 
OF WHICH APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT 
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THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING CERTAIN 
FINDINGS. 
In Point 2, Appellant complains that the Court 
erred in finding that the plaintiff did not receive 
a copy of the Offering Circular and in Point 4, that 
the Court erred in finding that the plaintiff pur-
chased 60 shares of stock and a'lso erred in finding 
that the offer to sell was with respect 'to 60 shares 
of stock rather than 20 shares of stock. 
In connection with these contentions of Appel-
lant, there is evidence in support of each of these 
findings of fact and again the finding of the trier 
of the facts should not be set aside. The 'testimony 
of the Appellant is that a copy of the Offering Cir-
cular was given 'to the Respondent and Respondent 
testified that he did not receive it. The court made 
a finding that the Respondent did not receive a 
copy of the Offering Circular. Against such a find-
ing the case referred to at Page 19 of Appellant's 
Brief has no validity for in that case there was a 
subscription contract signed by the purchasers of 
the stock which contained provisions that "no con-
ditions, agreements, or representations other 'than 
those printed above shall bind the company." In the 
instant case, there was no signed subscription con-
tract or any fact which ca1ne to Respondent's notice 
that an agreement on the part of the company to 
resell the stock was beyond the scope of the author-
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i ty of the president of the corporation. Nor is the 
case Kilbride v. Moss, also cited at Page 19 of Ap-
peHant's Brief, in point as is evident from the quoted 
portion of the case. That case was brought against 
an officer of the company and there is nothing in 
the decision deal'ing with the question of the scope 
of authority of an agent of a corporation. 
Appellan't also complains that the court erred 
in making two other findings of fact. The cour't 
found that the Respondent purchased 60 shares of 
stock. (Ex. D-6) is for two checks, one of $1200.00 
and one of $2400.00 or a total of $3600.00 which 
represents the purchase price of 60 shares of the 
capital stock. The checks are those of Lincoln C. 
White, the Respondent in this case. The court found 
that he purchased these 60 shares of stock. The 
Respondent had intended transferring some of these 
shares of stock to some fr'iends of his in Denver, 
Colorado, but it appeared that these friends later 
did not wish to take over these shares of stock. 
(R. 35) 
I't appears that these findings made by the Dis-
trict Court are supported by evidence and should 
not be disturbed. 
POINT 3 OF THE APPELLANT IS THAT 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
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The appellant argues this proposition from the 
viewpoint that this agreement obligated the corpor-
ation to redeem its own capital stock and that re-
demption of its capita'l stock would be violative of 
Section 16-2-16, U.C.A. 53. This collateral agree-
n1ent to resell the stock does not constitute an agree-
ment on the par't of the corporation to redeem the 
stock. Even if it did, sub-division "F" of the quoted 
section of the statute would permit th'is corporation 
to redeem this stock. The evidence shows that re-
demption would not cause the impairment of that 
portion of its assets acquired as consideration for 
its sales. The court made a finding of fact that the 
corporation had a surplus of $50,000.00 and that 
the payment of $6120.00 for the purchase of such 
capital stock would not cause the impairment of 
that portion of the defendant corporation's assets 
which were acquired as consideration for 1ts shares 
and then the court went on to conclude that the con-
tract is not contrary to the laws of the Sta:te of 
Utah and is not an illegal con tract. This finding of 
the court that the purchase of such stock would not 
cause the impairment of that portion of its assets 
acquired as consideration of l ts sales of stock is fully 
supported by the evidence. The Minutes of the meet-
ing of January 3, 1958 already set forth in this brief, 
contains the following statement: "Mr. Timpson 
asked the Board's opinion as to whether or not they 
should cut the $60.00 issue now and go into the new 
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stock issue program. We will be able to go into 
Idaho with $50,000.00 of surplus". This showed 
that the corporation had a $50,000.00 surplus and 
i1t is permitted to redeem this capita1 stock out of 
this surplus. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the three 
points in Appellant's argument deal with Appel-
lant's contention that 'the court erred in making 
certain findigs of fact. We have indicated that each 
of the findings are sufficiently supported by the 
evidence and we respectfully submit that these find-
ings should not be disturbed. 
Respondent does not believe that the agreement 
made by the Appellant was to redeem its own ca pita1 
stock, but even if it was an agreement to redeem 
its own capital stock, it is legal for the corporation 
to do so inasmuch as the corporation had a surplus 
of $50,000.00 a:t the particular time when it made 
this agreement. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of 
the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WHITE, ARNOVITZ, & SMITH 
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